A NEW METRIC FOR HEDGING MORTGAGE PIPELINE FALLOUT RISK

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ABSTRACT
In this white paper, we introduce a new metric for hedging mortgage pipeline fallout risk. We benchmark that metric against common practice in the mortgage origination industry and show that by taking into consideration the steady-state nuances of a mortgage pipeline, a mortgage originator can reduce overall exposure to interest rate risk.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Toby Huskinson brings years of experience to Optimal Blue, with an education that gives him a unique perspective and the ability to have a significant impact on business performance. Toby holds a Bachelor of Science in Math, a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science, a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, a Master of Science in Computer Science, a Master of Science in Operations Research, and an MBA with specializations in Finance and Marketing. In his free time, Toby is an adjunct professor at SMU and is currently pursuing a PhD with a focus on combinatorial optimization.
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

One of the primary components in establishing an appropriate hedge ratio is determining the likelihood that a locked loan will make it to funding/closing. For example, if a borrower is locked-in, but fails to meet credit worthiness verifications, then the lock will be cancelled, and the mortgage will fail to materialize. The scenario where a loan fails to reach funding is called fallout. The converse, where a loan successfully reaches funding, is referred to as pull-through. If pull-through is not appropriately considered, then the hedge ratio will be too high, and the pipeline will be over-hedged.

In FIGURE 1, an example pipeline shock is shown. The net of the loans in the pipeline and the corresponding coverage (TBAs) demonstrates a balanced position whereby an interest rate movement in either direction will be non-biased.
Conversely, in **FIGURE 2**, the value of the loans is adjusted by the loans’ estimated pull-through likelihood. Without a corresponding adjustment in the hedge ratio, the net position is short, demonstrating an imbalanced exposure to interest rate changes. In order to mitigate potential imbalances, an accurate estimate of pull-through is necessary.

![FIGURE 2](image)

It is common for mortgage originators to calculate pull-through estimates by dividing the total number\(^1\) of funded loans by the total number of locks [**FORMULA 1**]. This proportion is then used to adjust the hedge ratio accordingly. Sophisticated originators will attempt to stratify the data set into subsets (such as loan status) to attain more granular estimates [**FORMULA 2**].

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\(^1\) Historically, some pull-through methodologies have measured pull-through in terms of total volume. This approach is erroneous, because each loan represents a dependent binary variable (either the loan pulled through or it fell out). Weighting the dependent variables by loan amount will create an oversampling bias in the statistic towards larger loans. If loan amount is desired to be incorporated into the model, it should be incorporated as an independent (predictor) variable with its own prediction coefficient.
Both calculations are flawed, because they fail to appropriately consider steady state dynamics within the mortgage pipeline. Specifically, they don’t account for the fact that loans pull-through and fallout at different speeds.

\[
\text{PullThrough}\% = \frac{\text{Funded Count}}{\text{Locked Count}}
\]

\[
\text{PullThrough}\%_i = \frac{\text{Funded Count}_i}{\text{Locked Count}_i}
\]

Where \(i\) is a subset of the original data set.

During the origination process, the loan moves through many statuses as specified by the originator’s internal operations. It is expected that the pull-through likelihood of the loan will increase as the loan moves towards later statuses. The lifecycle can be visualized as a state diagram, such as the one in FIGURE 3.
In general, loans that fund and loans that cancel tend to stay in the pipeline for different lengths of time. One can ascertain from **FIGURE 3** why this would be the case. Loans have multiple paths to exit the pipeline to a “cancelled” state, but they will only have one path to exit the pipeline to a “funded” state.

We measured the pipeline wait times for both funded and cancelled loans for a large national mortgage originator with a $300 million pipeline. As illustrated below in **FIGURE 4**, we see that for this originator, loans tend to fallout faster than they pull-through.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AVERAGE WAIT TIMES FOR A LARGE NATIONAL ORIGINATOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cancelled Loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 4**

More specifically, the pull-through metric is the ratio of the arrival rate of funded loans, \( \lambda_{\text{funded}} \), to the total number of observations, \( \lambda_{\text{funded}} + \lambda_{\text{cancelled}} \), where \( \lambda_{\text{cancelled}} \) is the arrival rate of the cancelled loans [**FORMULA 3**].

\[
pullthrough\% = \frac{\lambda_{\text{funded}}}{\lambda_{\text{funded}} + \lambda_{\text{cancelled}}}
\]

**FORMULA 3**

When hedging, one does not hedge the arrival of a loan into the system. One hedges the loan for the entire lifecycle of loan as it exists within the system. For this reason, we must use Little’s Law [**FORMULA 4**] to convert the \( \lambda \) into \( L \), the steady-state length of the system.
By converting both $\lambda_{\text{fund}}$ and $\lambda_{\text{cancel}}$ into $L_{\text{fund}}$ and $L_{\text{cancel}}$ respectively, we can build a steady-state pull-through metric to establish a more accurate hedge ratio [**FORMULA 5**].

Similar to prevailing convention, the data can be stratified, and the steady-state metric can be evaluated for each loan status [**FORMULA 6**].

**FORMULA 4**

$$L = \lambda W, \text{ where } W \text{ is the average wait time}$$

**FORMULA 5**

$$\text{PullThrough}\%_{\text{steady}} = \frac{L_{\text{fund}}}{L_{\text{fund}} + L_{\text{cancel}}}$$

**FORMULA 6**

$$\text{PullThrough}\%_{\text{steady[i]}} = \frac{L_{\text{fund}[i]}}{L_{\text{fund}[i]} + L_{\text{cancel}[i]}}$$

Where $i$ is a subset of the original data set:
In section two, we continue this discussion by introducing our methodology for building an experiment to test the Little’s Law concept. In section three, we show our results. In section four, we state our conclusions and discuss avenues for further research.

**SECTION 2: IMPLEMENTATION**

We constructed our experiment using walk-forward analysis [Formula 3]. Using the data set for a large national originator with a $300 million pipeline, we experimented over 365 days from the period of January 31st, 2016 to January 31st, 2017. For each day during the experimentation period, we gathered the preceding 365 days of loan information (loans that had either cancelled or funded) as a training set. Our testing set was the loans actively being hedged in the pipeline at the observation date.

For each observation date, we generated a model such as the one depicted in **FIGURE 5**.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATIFICATION</th>
<th>OBSERVATIONS</th>
<th>PULL THROUGH</th>
<th>$W_{el}$</th>
<th>$W_{st}$</th>
<th>PULL THROUGH$_{steady}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BASE</td>
<td>8288</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>35.42</td>
<td>27.82</td>
<td>0.868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPROVED$^2$</td>
<td>6486</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>0.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC PREP</td>
<td>4974</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>0.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCESSING</td>
<td>4930</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>0.847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STARTED</td>
<td>3875</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>0.718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 5**

The model gives the pull-through estimates for both the non-steady-state and the steady-state metrics for both the base estimate and the decision tree estimates for each of the status stratifications. For every observation date, we would estimate each loan, n, in the testing set according to both its base value and its status stratification. We then identified whether each individual loan would eventually fall out or pull through.

$^2$ Note: Some statuses have been removed for brevity.
We calculated the various model performances by differencing each loan estimate (a ratio from 0 to 1) from the actual result. If the loan pulled through, the result would be 1. Conversely, if the loan was cancelled, the actual result would be 0.

We multiplied this difference by the loan amount to give us the dollar exposure that the estimate error caused to the hedge. By taking the absolute value of the sum of the individual loan exposures multiplied by the loan amount for each observation period, \( t \), we determine the overall daily model performance owed to over- or under-hedging [FORMULA 7].

We then converted the exposure metric into a percent of the overall pipeline [FORMULA 8].

We used the median percent exposure value during the experimentation period to gauge the overall efficacy of each strategy.

\[
\text{Exposure}_t = \sum_{n}^{N} \left[ (\text{Estimate}_n - \text{Actual}_n) \times \text{LoanAmount}_n \right]
\]

\[
\text{PercentExposure}_t = \frac{\text{Exposure}_t}{\sum_{n}^{N} \text{LoanAmount}_n}
\]
SECTION 3: RESULTS
Loans within each status that will eventually cancel tend to stall, causing the steady-state pull-through metric to fall as opposed to rise. This disparity is more pronounced in the early stages of the loan lifecycle.

In FIGURE 6, we chart the average pull-through for actuals, baseline non-steady-state and steady-state estimates for the entire pipeline on each day during the experimentation. In FIGURE 7, we compare actuals to the stratified estimates.
We note that for the base estimates, the non-steady-state metric tends to underestimate and for the stratified estimates, the non-steady state metric tends to over-estimate.

As shown in **FIGURE 8**, we discovered the median percent of the pipeline that was exposed due to pull-through estimation error for each strategy. The median percent-exposure illustrates that the steady-state metric outperforms the non-steady-state metric in both the base and stratified estimation methodologies.

In addition to exposure, we also calculated the average dollar weighted estimate error for each of the strategies in **FIGURE 9**. The averages illustrate a bias in the non-steady-state metrics. The steady-state metrics are closer to zero, indicating the steady-state metrics are less prone to bias.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEDIAN PERCENT-EXPOSURE</th>
<th>DOLLAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE ESTIMATE ERROR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NON-STEADY-STATE</td>
<td>STEADY-STATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASE</td>
<td>4.75%</td>
<td>3.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATIFIED</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
<td>2.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NON-STEADY-STATE</th>
<th>STEADY-STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BASE</td>
<td>4.23%</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATIFIED</td>
<td>-3.36%</td>
<td>1.66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 9**
SECTION 4: CONCLUSION
We have introduced a new methodology for estimating pipeline fallout risk using Little's Law. Walk-forward analysis is used to show that (1) the standard convention for estimating pipeline fallout risk is biased, and (2) the new methodology outperforms the strategy employed by standard convention.

It is possible for the model to be elaborated upon using regression tree techniques, splitting the data where it is most appropriate to do so. For each node in the regression tree, the steady-state pull-through metric can be used to drive the calculations for entropy.

Lastly, we have avoided conversation on the impact of market movement on the pull-through estimations. It is reasonable to overlay a market movement model on top of the estimations described above.

ABOUT OPTIMAL BLUE
Optimal Blue operates the mortgage industry’s Digital Marketplace, connecting originators, investors, and providers with a single, unified technology and value-added services platform. Optimal Blue’s Digital Marketplace enables originators to automate their entire secondary marketing operation from content through commitment and enables investors and leading providers to accelerate the loan origination process by leveraging automated data exchange, streamlined value delivery, robust innovations, and actionable business intelligence. Together, these originators, investors, and providers form a unique, multi-sided marketplace touching one of every four mortgage loans closed nationally each year. For more information, please visit www.optimalblue.com.